ROUBINI: LA REGULACIÓN FINANCIERA NECESARIA PERO ¿IMPOSIBLE?

Según publica el Financial Times dice N. Roubini - el que predijo la crisis - que

• self-regulation..., in effect, meant no regulation;
• market discipline... does not exist when there is euphoria and irrational exuberance;
• internal risk management fails because – as a former chief executive of Citi put it – when the music is playing you gotta stand up and dance.
• rating agencies... had massive conflicts of interest and a
• supervisory system dependent on principles rather than rules.

we now need more binding rules on liquidity, capital, leverage, transparency, compensation and so on...

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But the design of the new system should be robust enough to counter three types of problems with rules: A tendancy toward

• ‘regulatory arbitrage’ should be bourne in mind, as bankers can find creative ways to bypass rules faster than regulators can improve them.
• ‘jurisdictional arbitrage’ as financial activity may move to more lax jurisdictions. And finally,
• ‘regulatory capture’ as regulators and supervisors are often captured - via revolving doors and other mechanisms - by the financial industry...

Según Roubini, las siguientes ideas ("capital ideas" de las finanzas del último cuarto del siglo XX) se han demostrado erróneas: .

• “efficient market hypothesis” that deluded itself about the absence of market failures such as asset bubbles;
• “rational expectations” paradigm that clashes with the insights of behavioral economics and finance;
• “self-regulation of markets and institutions” that clashes with the classical agency problems in corporate governance that are thenselves exacerbated in financial companies by the greater degree of asymmetric information -how can a chief executive or a board monitor the risk-taking of thousands of separate profit-and-loss accounts?
• distortions of compensation paid to bankers and traders.
• securitization reduces systemic risk rather than actually increase it;
• risk can properly priced when the opacity and lack of transparency of financial firms and new instruments leads to unpriceable uncertainty rather than priceable risk.