martes, 26 de octubre de 2010

Obligación del asesor de revelar conflictos de interés: el caso del asesor que recibe remuneración del emisor y del cliente

Según el blog de Harvard
In a recent settled enforcement action, the SEC (Matter of Valentine Capital Asset Management).. found that the adviser “fail[ed] to fully and adequately disclose a material conflict of interest” by not informing its clients that the adviser would receive an additional commission if its clients accepted its recommendation to switch from one series of a managed fund to another series in that same fund.  The SEC reached this conclusion despite the fact that the adviser fully disclosed all commission costs to its clients.
Lo llamativo es que el cambio significaba, para el cliente, volver a pagar comisiones desde el principio (ya habían alcanzado el tope de comisiones en la primera inversión). Y que el asesor tenía un incentivo irresistible para aconsejar al cliente el cambio. ¡Los límites de la transparencia!
Despite disclosure of the fees, the SEC found that the adviser was required to make “full and clear disclosure” about any conflict of interest in recommending the exchanges, and that it “failed to disclose to clients that [it] would receive additional commissions” if clients followed the advice.  Consequently the SEC found that the adviser breached its fiduciary duty.
La SEC publica un documento de 174 páginas con reglas para los asesores de inversiones. Básicamente tienen que entregar al cliente un texto en el que proporcionen información que permita la comparación. Y esta cuestión está en el Item 5
“requires an adviser that receives compensation attributable to the sale of a security or other investment product (e.g., brokerage commissions), or whose personnel receive such compensation, to disclose this practice and the conflict of interest it creates, and to describe how the adviser addresses this conflict.
The item simply recognizes that an adviser that accepts compensation from the sale to a client of securities has an incentive to base investment recommendations on the amount of compensation it will receive, rather than on the client’s best interests, and thus involves a significant conflict of interest.
Lo que me resulta más fascinante es cómo puede el asesor tratar el conflicto. ¿Diciéndole al cliente que, a pesar de que él – el asesor - va a ganar con el cambio en el objeto de la inversión, su recomendación no está basada en eso sino en el mejor interés del cliente?
Por cierto, se ha publicado el Report of the New York Stock Exchange Commission on Corporate Governance (informa el mismo blog).

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